Mapping Out the Japanese Mergers & Acquisitions Patterns - The Influence of Macro Factors on M & As by Nakamura, H. Richard
MAPPING OUT THE JAPANESE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS PATTERN - THE INFLUENCE OF





Postal address: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Office address: Sveav￿gen 65
Telephone: +46 8 736 93 60  Telefax: +46 8 31 30 17  E-mail: japan@hhs.se  Internet:
http://www.hhs.se/eijs1
Mapping out the Japanese Mergers and
Acquisitions pattern
- the influence of macro factors on M&As
H. Richard Nakamura
The European Institute of Japanese Studies
Stockholm School of Economics
P.O. Box 6501
113 83 Stockholm




Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are not a new phenomenon in Japanese business.
Especially after the end of the Allied occupation of Japan, the number of domestic M&As
rose sharply due to the reconsolidation of former Zaibatsu firms broken up by the occupation
authorities. During the Japanese post-war economic recovery, M&As between non-keiretsu
firms became more and more common.
After the burst of the ￿bubble￿ economy in 1991 a new era of M&A started. Together with
deregulations in a number of non-tradable sectors, a relatively large number of foreign firms
have entered the Japanese market, using M&As as a tool of market entry. In many sectors, the
sudden exposure to international competition has forced the incumbent firms in the formerly
protected industries to restructure and streamline their operations in order to survive the new
order. For the foreign firms, the opened-up economy has meant new business opportunities,
and a chance to compete on more equal terms with the Japanese firms on their home market.
For Japanese firms, international M&As have become a viable alternative to domestic ones
due to market liberalization and the economic realities of the 1990s. Furthermore, foreign
firms have now discovered M&A as a cheaper tool to enter a new market and achieve market-
specific knowledge, instead of trying to force a market entry through expensive greenfield
investments and joint ventures.
Here, it is interesting to ask to what extent macro factors have influenced the M&A pattern in
Japan. Does economic activity matter for the Japanese M&A activities, or have they lived
￿their own life￿? What are the effects of institutional changes on the M&A pattern during the
1990￿s?
In this paper, the short-run pattern of Japanese post-bubble inward (cross-border) and
domestic M&As is analyzed econometrically, using macroeconomic data and data on
Japanese M&A.
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1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are not a new phenomenon in Japanese business.
Especially after the end of the Allied occupation of Japan in 1952, the number of
domestic M&As rose sharply due to the reconsolidation of former Zaibatsu firms
broken up by the occupation authorities. During the Japanese post-war economic
recovery, M&As between non-keiretsu firms became more and more common.
However, after the burst of the ￿bubble￿ economy in 1991 a new era of M&As
started. Along with deregulation in a number of non-tradable sectors, a large influx of
foreign firms has occurred, using M&As as a tool of entering the Japanese market. In
many sectors, the sudden exposure to international competition has forced the
incumbent firms in the formerly protected industries to restructure and streamline
their operations in order to survive the new order. For the foreign firms, the opened-
up economy meant new business opportunities, and a chance to compete on more
equal terms with the Japanese firms on their home market.
For Japanese firms, international M&As have become a viable alternative to domestic
ones due to market liberalization and the economic realities of the 1990s.
Furthermore, foreign firms have now discovered M&A as a cheaper tool to enter a
new market and achieve market-specific knowledge, instead of attempting a market
entry through expensive greenfield investments and joint ventures.
M&As as a phenomenon have interested scholars for many years, and have been
studied at length. A special feature of M&As, namely the wave-like pattern of M&As,
has been discussed at length in the literature. In fact, the wave pattern of mergers has
been a topic within economics for about hundred years
1, starting with the great merger
waves occurring in the United States during the last decades of the 19
th century.
Despite the emergence of modern financial economics, researchers have fallen short
of developing a general theory of M&As and M&A waves. As a result of this
deficiency on the theoretical side, most research has been empirical and ac-hoc in
nature, where linear time series analyses have been prominently applied, and more
recently, non-linear time series models and Markov switching-regime models (e.g.
Town, 1992).
                                                
1 Resende, p. 85.3
In the literature, there are also suggestions for psychological factors influencing M&A
patterns, e.g. the ￿herd behavior￿. Due to the limited scope of this paper,
psychological aspects of M&As, however interesting, will not be discussed here.
Further, this paper will be purely empirical in nature, employing a model inspired by
Ali-Yrkk￿ (2002). Owing to the nature of the data available, the analysis of this paper
is limited to the Japanese M&A pattern during the 1990￿s. The analysis focuses
therefore on the influence of selected macroeconomic and financial variables on the
pattern of M&As to see whether the Japanese economic activity can explain the most
recent wave of M&As. In addition, dummy analysis is conducted in order to assess
the influence of the 1998 Tokyo Big Bang reforms.
2. Previous studies
Why do a M&A? This question, or better to say the general motives for M&As, is
discussed at length in the literature (see among others Ali-Yrkk￿, 2002, and Chapman
& Edmond, 2000, and R￿ller et al., 2000). However, the common wisdom of M&As,
other things being equal, is that they are regarded as a tool for an acquirer to increase
the value of his own company and to procure future cash flow of the acquired
company (or so-called ￿due diligence￿). On the other hand, for the acquired company,
an M&A could mean a way out of a financially distressed situation or a mean to cash
in a value increase for an entrepreneur. Apart from this ideal and general concept of
M&As, other exogenous factors naturally affect the M&A decisions, such as
macroeconomic variables and the state of the financial markets.
On the global level, the steel and chemical industries
2 have historically been stages for
major M&A activity after the Second World War, as well as in the financial sector
after far-reaching deregulation during the 1980￿s (for the U.S. and European cases).
But the M&A waves have not been limited to these industries only. An example of
studies in M&A patterns is found in Walter (1993), who has made a value ranking of
M&A deals in U.S. and Europe during 1985 and 1991. He found a tendency that the
bulk part of M&As were occurring in similar industries on both sides of the Atlantic,
                                                
2 Including the pharmaceutical industry.4
involving all major industries. However, he does not discuss in depth the influence of
the business environment on these firms or how it has affected the number of M&A
deals. Further, a discussion on how external shocks have affected the pattern of M&A
is also lacking.
For the European case, the pattern of M&As in the chemical industry has been
analyzed in an event study by Chapman and Edmond (2000). They focus their study
on the shift in ownership relations among the chemical firms in the European Union
(EU), finding that companies from Northern Europe tend to acquire companies in
Southern Europe. Again, the institutional framework of the chemical industry is not
analyzed from the M&A point of view, and the question left unanswered is if the
pattern of the European chemical industry is representative for the M&As that takes
place in EU.
In another study, the U.S. M&A wave pattern is analyzed through Gaussian
semiparametric and Exact Maximum Likelihood methods. The results of Barkoulas et
al. (2001) reveal that post-wave effects on the U.S. M&A pattern, denoted by the
authors as ￿long-memory process￿, have had long-lasting effects on the M&As during
the subsequent periods. This ￿long-lasting memory￿ denotes a lagged process after
shocks
3, and in addition to the influence these ￿shocks￿ have in the time periods
immediately after, Barkoulas et al. also found that these ￿shock￿ effects were
significant in the long run, that is, they influenced the subsequent M&A waves. The
authors also discuss what mechanisms that might trigger merger waves. Following
Gort￿s (1969) arguments, Barkoulas et al. mean that the underlying causes depend
basically on different perceptions of corporate value. In other words, shareholders of a
company value their stocks lower after a ￿shock￿ than the potential acquirer(s). After
reaching a critical mass of M&As, a merger wave will start.
Thus, the studies of the kind we have seen above do not relate to the institutional
framework or the business environment (neither on the macro level nor the micro
level) for the industries concerned, nor do they analyze the effects of various types of
shocks in explaining M&A patterns. To see the pattern in M&As more or less as
                                                
3 Unfortunately, the authors do not define clearly whether their meaning of ￿shocks￿ means
disturbances on the industrial, country or global level; these do not necessarily affect firms in the same
way.5
isolated events in ownership change without regarding exogenous variables is not
particularly rewarding, since there is a risk that important trigger mechanisms for
M&As are missed.
The M&A pattern in Japan has been very similar to the U.S. and EU ones with deals
occurring in the same industries. However, one major exception to this general picture
does exist: the cross-border M&As have been virtually non-existent. Especially for
international mergers, the number of deals has always been extremely low
4.
An attempt to address the external factors￿ influence on M&A pattern is Ali-Yrkk￿￿s
(2002) study, where the author has analyzed the pattern of M&As in Finland from
macroeconomic variables. The time period under study was 1980-2001, during which
Finland saw a boom and a sudden plunge in GDP growth. As in Japan, Finland
experienced a ￿bubble￿, led by heavy international borrowing by the private sector,
which fuelled private consumption. This was made possible by far-reaching
liberalization of the financial markets and a reform of the tax system. Around the turn
of 1980￿s, Finland experienced severe external shocks: the COMECON trade
suddenly disappeared, and a speculative attack on the Finnish Markka occurred,
resulting in a heavy drop in the private sector consumption. Obviously, this aggregate
shock was clearly reflected on the Finnish M&A activities.
Ali-Yrkk￿￿s results show the high explanatory power of the independent variables
(GDP, market capitalization and the number of listed firms) on the European (and
Finnish) M&As. However without drawing causal inferences, the author makes a
three-level proposition. From the results, he suggests that the M&A decision can be
seen as a top-down flow, where macro level factors causes shocks on the industrial
level, to which managers on micro level reacts and make decisions whether or not to
engage in M&A activity (see figure 1).
The factors chosen by Ali-Yrkk￿ are rather intuitive, and are to a large extent self-
explanatory. The factors Shocks, Economic motives, Managerial motives and Hubrid
                                                
4 There are no reliable data on international mergers in Japan before 1985, but the occurrence has been
low ever since the modernization of the country in the 19
th century. The number of international
mergers in Japan after 1993 has only been three, all initiated by Korean or Taiwanese firms. The
preferred entry mode for foreign firms has been more traditional, such as through acquisitions, joint
ventures or greenfield investments.6
(sic!) motives do require some comment. Shocks can be defined as a sudden
revaluation of the current order. Good examples are the Oil crises of the 1970￿s or the
IT revolution in the 1990￿s, but also revaluation in values (e.g. globalization) and
change in legal framework (e.g. deregulation) can have extensive influence on an
individual firm￿s M&A decision. Economic motives are factors like cost efficiency
and increased market shares. Managerial motives are defined by Ali-Yrkk￿ as being
￿hidden￿ and opportunistic behavior of managers, much in line with what is discussed
in the literature on moral hazard. Hubrid motives are a set of irrational (economic)
motives for carrying out an M&A, such as overoptimistic expectations on a particular
deal. However relevant in studies of M&A, variables such as Hubrid motives have to
be defined carefully in order to be employed in a quantitative analysis such as found
in this paper.
Figure 1. Causes of mergers and acquisitions (From Ali-Yrkk￿, 2002, p. 25).
Industrial shocks as a trigger to M&A activity is consistent with the analyses made
using longer time series on M&A. In a sectoral study on the M&A wave pattern in the
UK, Resende (1999) found through Markow switching models that the shock effect
on M&A waves was significant, and were more profound on an aggregate level than
on a sectoral level. Resende found three interesting properties in the data. First, the


















walk specification was strongly rejected, thus indicating that endogenous shocks
indeed influence the M&A pattern. The third, although weaker, finding is that M&A
waves in one sector appear to display co-movements with other sectors.
Using U.S. data, Town (1992) has also found evidence of external shocks influencing
the M&A pattern. However, focusing primarily on finding appropriate models
describing long time series of M&As, Town discusses the triggers to U.S. merger
waves since the end of the 19
th century. It is clear that the merger waves coincide with
important institutional changes or external shocks, but it is not obvious a priori
whether these exogenous factors or shocks have a positive or negative effect on
M&As. An example of this is the Great Depression in the U.S., which should have
had a tremendous depressive effect on the number of M&As if the hypothesis that
M&A waves coincide with business cycles was true (see e.g. Nelson, 1959). As a
matter of fact, the opposite was true in the case of the Great Depression ￿ the number
of M&As increased. Therefore, there has to be more to M&As than merely being
influenced by business cycles.
This is potentially a hard nut to crack for anyone doing research on M&A. However,
one solution to this paradox might be to analyze the problem from two different
angles. On the one side, from the perspective of the buyer, there are several modes of
M&A. Traditionally, a ￿pure￿ merger (apart from mergers that are de facto
acquisitions) is conducted by swapping shares or setting up completely new legal
entities, whereas an acquisition is carried out mainly through cash deals. From the
1980￿s and onwards, acquisitions involving share issuing have become more and
more common in all major industrialized countries, including Japan. But again, in
terms of absolute numbers, the number of deals involving share swapping is very low
compared to the U.S. and Europe. This is a reflection of the structure of the Japanese
M&As, which for example during the 1995-2001 period, to a large degree involved
firms that were not listed
5.
For M&As, where shares play an important part in the deal settlement, the same
rationales as for share issues come into consideration. This type of M&As are rare
                                                
5 The non-listed firms￿ share (mostly SMFS) of the total number of M&As was between 56% and 70%
(MARR, July 2001, p. 40).8
during economic activity downturns, since the stock market trading gets lower in
terms of price, traded volume and number of calls. Under such conditions, an
attractive take-over bid (TOB) can suddenly become unattractive and as long as a
M&A deal is dependent on share swapping or share issuing, that particular deal will
become hopelessly futile. On the other hand, the cash deals are rather straightforward
and uncomplicated compared to share swapping deals. This type of deal is common
during recessions, when companies with ample cash reserves or funding possibilities
6
typically acquire financially distressed companies. For the Japanese case, this is the
most frequently occurring type of firm acquisition.
A seller￿s motives for engaging in M&As are more diverse and difficult to pinpoint.
Therefore, it is again fruitful for this analysis to separate the boom and recession
situations. Connecting to the earlier observations that M&A deals that involve share
issuing or swapping tend to take place during booms, a seller might benefit from this
type of offer by acquiring securities in the post-M&A entity. On the other hand, cash
offers might be a tempting option for the selling side during recessions in order to bail
out from business, or in other words, get the most out of the remaining value of the
firm before ￿it￿s too late￿
7.
Other studies where macroeconomic variables have been used in order to explain
M&A activity are Shea (1991) (bond yields), Sowell (1992) (GDP), Baillie and
Bollerslev (1994) (interest rate differentials), and Diebold and Lindner (1996) (real
interest rates).
In this study, the pattern of the M&As that have occurred in Japan between January
1994 and March 2002 is analyzed on an aggregate level in order to see whether the
M&A activity can be estimated using macroeconomic variables. In addition, dummy
analysis is employed to assess the between-group differences and the effects of one-
time shocks on the M&A pattern.
                                                
6 For example, investment funds or through bank loans or bond issues.
7 Here, we have the problem of asymmetric information. A buyer or a seller might not have exactly the
same information as the counterpart, leading to opportunistic behavior and wrong valuation of assets
and future cash flow. However, the problem of corporate valuation per se is not discussed in this paper.9
3. The model
As implied above, the development of a merger theory is still in its infancy. There
exist few theoretical papers on this topic compared to the abundant number of
empirical papers. On the other hand, the methodology of M&A analysis has
developed rapidly during the 1990￿s, owing much to the long and complete series of
U.S. statistics on M&As. However, there is still lively discussion in the literature
about the variables that should be used to explain M&A patterns. The research on
M&A has therefore been, and still is, based on trial and error, and the quest for
variables that give a good fit in econometric analyses will probably continue for the
foreseeable future.
Having said this, there are good reasons to believe that macroeconomic variables are
important factors in explaining M&A patterns and the M&A decision making in
firms. In the European setting, cross-border M&A has often been a matter for larger
corporation. But as we have seen above, the number of cross-border M&As is
dwarfed by the much more frequently occurring domestic M&As. Even within the
EU, which supposedly has abolished all hindrances to free capital movement, the
number of cross-border M&As is still low. Japan constitutes no exception to this
picture, and in comparison with the European figures, one may say that the cross-
border out-in M&As in Japan are almost non-existant.
Historically, the trigger for many M&A decisions in Japan has been a matter of timing
and future ownership structure (such as difficulties in finding a successor to the
family business) rather than a long-term business development strategy
8. Even though
this primarily applies to SMFs, the large firm M&As have also been characterized by
more arbitrary than systematic decisions. Therefore, by looking at past M&As, there
are reasons to believe that the M&A pattern in the short run is rather unsystematic for
an individual firm. In addition, it is hard to separate M&A deals that are results of
profound analyses from deals that have been carried out due to governmental pressure
and other non-rational reasons
9. In this context, it is worth noting that concepts such
                                                
8 Interviews with Katsushi Harada and Osamu Yasuda fall 2001.
9 M&As of this kind have occurred mostly within the financial sector and especially among the savings
associations and the savings unions.10
as due diligence only recently have become common in Japanese management and
normative M&A literature in Japan.
The rationale for the choice of variables is as follows. For a firm considering an
M&A, several considerations have to be taken before a deal is settled. Within the
firm, factors like financial and business situation are of course crucial. Relating to the
Ali-Yrkk￿ model (see figure 1), these are the micro level factors in M&A decisions.
These micro level factors are in turn influenced by the context in which the firm is
doing business, that is, the macro level factors. Besides being the common
macroeconomic indicators such as (real and nominal) GDP, interest rate, and exchange
rate, there are also institutional factors such as the legal structure, industrial
regulations, and commonly accepted business practices.
Earlier research has shown that shocks are important triggers to M&As. As seen in
figure 1, examples that are given by Ali-Yrkk￿ are economic booms, technology
development, globalization and changes in regulations and law. For Japan, the
financial industry is an interesting example of how an industry was exposed with a
￿shock￿, although this is not representative for all industries. In 1998, the first steps in
the most extensive deregulation reform so far in Japan were taken. Rather suddenly,
the domestic actors were faced with liberalized competition from both domestic and
foreign firms. New competitors tried to introduce new business methods such as new
technology (i.e. internet banking), franchising, and new financial products in order to
increase revenues and cut costs. The domestic financial firms￿ counter-move was to
engage very actively in M&As and to emulate the competitors￿ technology and
business ideas. It is clear that changes in institutional framework, or ￿shocks￿, forced
the formerly protected financial firms to behave in a way they would have neverdone
otherwise.
The starting point for deriving a prediction model for the M&As occurring in Japan
has been to consider the context in which a manager or the board of a company is
found when an M&A decision is made. While simultaneously considering the micro
and macro level factors, it is assumed that a manager has the power of calling off a
potential deal at any time. Further, it is also assumed that a manager has perfect
information about the current business situation both within the industry and for the
country in general. If these assumptions hold, the macroeconomic variables that11
should influence managers in M&A decisions (when such an opportunity appears)
should be the current aggregate economic environment (such as GDP growth,
exchange rate and changing institutional settings, in period t) and the situation on the
financial markets in period t.
Because of the limited time period for the data series (discussed below), OLS
estimation was used for the analysis. Even though more sophisticated methods are
employed in earlier research, there are two major reasons for the choice of OLS
estimation. Firstly, there is no M&A time series data available for Japan of the kind
that is available for U.S. Secondly, even though the OLS method is rather blunt, the
estimation that is obtained gives a fairly good indication of the structure of the
phenomena under study.
A pilot model, including the JPY/USD exchange rate as a proxy for measuring the
out-in M&A, was formulated to see whether this particular variable had some
influence on the M&A activity. However, there are problems with including such
variable, because it is highly probable that the exchange rate is explaining not only the
dependent variable, but also the other macroeconomic variables that are included as
independent variables. However, the purpose was to see the extent of disturbances the
exchange rate had in the model, and as such, it became an interpretation tool for the
results from the final models. Not surprisingly, tests indicated serious
multicollinearity in the pilot model, and neither the coefficient of determination nor
the parameters were significant. As a result, this variable was dropped.
The final model chosen was:
lnM&At
 = β 1 + β 2 lnGDPt + β 3 lnTopixt + ε t,
where (all variables were transformed to natural logarithms):
lnM&A = the total number of M&As (out-in and in-in) in period t,
lnGDP = the Japanese nominal GDP (seasonally adjusted quarterly observations; in
1995 prices, denominated in JPY) in period t-1,
lnTopix = the average Topix index in period t,
β  are the parameters, t denotes time period and ε  is the error term.12
The choice of the GDP and the Topix index as independent variables are quite simple
and straightforward. GDP was chosen as an indicator for the general economic
activity. As mentioned above, the choice of variables was made considering the
viewpoint of a manager, and therefore the nominal GDP was chosen in favor of the
real GDP. The same rationale applies to the choice of the Topix index as an indicator
for the security market conditions. This variable is assumed to follow a random walk
pattern.
4. The data
The history of data recording relating to mergers and acquisitions in Japan is very
short. A more reliable recording of M&As was initiated only in 1985. However, due
to heavily restricted access to the earliest data, only the M&A data published in
MARR magazine from January 1994 to March 2002 was obtained. These limitations
in time dimension have restricted this study to a short-run M&A pattern analysis
instead of a long-run analysis, such as for the M&A waves studies mentioned
earlier
10. The data for the other variables used in the model was obtained through
OECD Main Economic Indicators and the EcoWin database.
The data is organized to form a quarterly time series, covering the period of January
1994 (94-1) to March 2002 (02-1), forming a total of 33 observations
11.
As seen in figure 2, the absolute number of M&As in Japan during the first quarter of
2002 has increased about eight times since the beginning of 1994. Most evident is the
development after the so-called ￿Tokyo Big Bang￿ reforms of April 1998. Included in
the reform package were not only the reformation and deregulation of the financial
markets, but also tougher requirements on transparency in bookkeeping and corporate
governance, which should be a positive factor so far as M&As are concerned. The
reform package was meant to be implemented over a two year period (however, some
stages are still waiting to be enforced at the time of writing), but evidently, the
number of M&As increased dramatically already during the first quarter following the
                                                
10 Based on U.S. data, Golbe and White (1993) have hypothesized that a length of a merger wave is
about forty years. This is probably not directly applicable to the historical M&A pattern of Japan, but it
gives an indication of the time horizon that is necessary in studying M&A waves.
11 For bivariate and partial correlations, please see the appendix.13
Figure 2. Number of M&As in Japan (MA denoting the total number of Out-In and In-In M&As)
between first quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 2002.
Figure 3. Index of the nominal GDP between first quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 2002 (100 =
1995).14
Figure 4. The Topix index between first quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 2002.
introduction of the reforms.
The quarterly GDP (figure 3) has had an uneven growth during the period. Even if the
yearly average records positive growth during the period concerned for this study, the
quarterly variation in growth has something of a stop-go pattern. This reflects the
depth of the GDP growth problem for Japan during the 1990￿s, and should be
reflected in the short-run M&A pattern if the assumptions specified in section 3 hold.
For the Topix index, figure 4 suggests a random walk pattern. The Dickey-Fuller Test
on 5% level gives on hand that this pattern indeed is non-stationary, or follows a
random walk pattern (tests not shown here). Again, if the assumptions specified in
section 3 hold, the Topix index should also be a factor influencing a firm￿s M&A
decision, whether it is fruitful to carry through an M&A deal or not.15
5. Results of the analysis
As mentioned earlier, the analysis uses OLS estimation. The dummy models are
estimated with Maximum Likelihood (ML) method.  The results from the econometric
analyses are presented in tables 1 and 2.
As seen in the table 1, the results from regression analysis suggest that the Japanese
M&A pattern can be explained to a high degree by the chosen independent variables,
that is, the nominal GDP and the Topix index. The parameters are significant, and the
signs are the expected ones. It is statistically clear that the nominal GDP has a strong
influence on the M&A pattern, and the variation of the dependent variable follows the
variation of the nominal GDP. On the other hand, the same results suggest that the
influence of the Topix index is somewhat limited, and varies negatively with the total
M&A. This result is opposite to what Ali-Yrkk￿ found in his study for European
conditions. Given that the variable ￿Market capitalization￿
12 in his model is equal to
the market value of listed securities, Topix should be, as the broadest indicator of
securities￿ average value at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), a comparable variable
to measure the same phenomena. If this assumption holds, there are interesting
differences between European M&As and Japanese M&As. As already mentioned,
the sign was positive for European conditions, while the sign is negative for all four
models in this study (see tables 1 and 2). There are several possible reasons for this
diversity in results. First of all, the time period for both studies is short. If a longer
time series were available, more significant results would probably have emerged.
Secondly, given that the parameters of the regression analyses in this paper are valid,
the difference in sign could emerge from unique patterns in the composition of M&A
deals. Ali-Yrkk￿ shows only the Finnish conditions
13. For Japan, however, most
M&As deals are settled in cash between SMFs, or between SMFs and larger firms.
Therefore, since few SMF shares are traded on the TSE, the development on the stock
exchange might be reduced to a more general indicator of the business and the
financial situation for firms. If European M&As mostly consist of deals between
                                                
12 See page 5 of this paper.
13 Ali-Yrkk￿, p. 18.16
larger listed firms, the total market value of listed stocks should affect the number of
M&A deals in a more direct manner.
Table 1. Regression results
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2)
Basic OLS model  ML estimation model (adjusted for autocorrelation)









N3 3 3 3
F-statistics 45.88*** 90.09***
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
Table 2. Dummy (pooled) regression results
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(3) (4)
Dummy model  Dummy model
ML estimation ML estimation







Dummy (M&AOUT-IN = 1) -2.22*** -2.24***
(-7.71) (-8.91)




N6 6 6 6
F-statistics 88.08*** 68.40***
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.17
Having said this, the results of the basic model should be taken with some caution due
to the limitations in the data material and the nature of the chosen variables.
Therefore, I will not make any extensive interpretations of the magnitude of the
variables￿ influence on the total M&As for the specific period between the 1
st quarter
of 1994 and the 1
st quarter of 2002, suggested by the parameters.
On the other hand, the results of the dummy models are more interesting than the
results from the basic model. The first dummy model was designed to see whether
there are differences in the intercept between In-In M&As and Out-In M&As. T-test
showed
14 that the difference in the intercept is statistically significant. For the second
dummy model, an additional dummy was augmented to see differences in the
intercept for each of M&A categories given the pre- and post-Big Bang period. Also
here, t-test showed
15 that the differences in the intercept are statistically significant.
As expected, the differences in the intercept were substantial. All other things being
equal, the level of Out-In M&A was on average 12%
16 of the In-In M&A level during
the period. As mentioned above, this difference was statistically significant on the 5%
level. Further, looking at figure 2, there are good reasons to believe that the Tokyo
Big Bang reforms have had some effects on the short-run M&A pattern. To test this, a
model incorporating a dummy variable for Big Bang reforms was constructed. The
results of this regression indicate that there was a sharp rise in the number of M&A
deals, however significant only on 10% level. The difference in the intercept between
pre- and post-Big Bang period was not as dramatic as the one between the M&A
categories, but for both Out-In and In-In M&A, the number of deals in the post-Big
Bang reform period was on average 71% more than for the pre-reform period, all
other things being equal.
Dummy models testing for differences not only in the intercept but also in the
regression line were also constructed. However, given the results of the t-tests
17, it
was not possible to reject the null hypothesis, or in other words, there was no
indication that the regression lines were different for the M&A categories, with or
                                                
14 Results not shown here.
15 Ibid.
16 Antilog of the dummy parameter minus one, following Halvorsen￿s and Palmquist￿s (1980)
suggestion for obtaining the relative change in the mean of the dependent variable.
17 Results not shown here.18
without the dummy for pre- and post-Big Bang period. Therefore, only the results
from the dummy models testing for differences in the intercept are discussed here.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to study the influence of selected macro variables
on the Japanese M&A pattern, using a model inspired by another study on the
European short-run M&A pattern, made by Ali-Yrkk￿ (2002). Due to limitations in
the data material, however, I refrain from interpreting the regression results in this
study extensively. Having said this, the estimations in general and the dummy
analyses in particular still give interesting indications of the nature of the Japanese
M&As during the relatively short period of 1994 to 2002.
The regression results indicate the relevance of macro variables in explaining M&A
patterns also in the Japanese setting. The same results also suggest that there is a
possibility that other variables can explain Japanese M&A better, such as other
macro- and microeconomic variables or qualitative variables like managerial motives,
irrational behavior and cultural values.
Thus, the results of this analysis are in line with parts of Ali-Yrkk￿￿s results and
model (figure 1), by indicating that macro variables (in this context the GDP, the
Topix index and the Big Bang reform) can be important factors in explaining short-
run M&A patterns. However, what Ali-Yrkk￿ calls ￿Economic booms￿ in his model,
might better be rephrased as ￿Economic growth￿. From the regression results, there is
a significant indication that the economic growth does affect the M&A pattern in the
short run. Considering that Japanese economic growth has anything but ￿boomed￿ in
the 1990￿s, these results are particularly interesting. In order to clearly establish the
connection between GDP growth and the M&A pattern, a longer time series is of
course needed in order to see if this relationship is valid also in the long-run
perspective (e.g. over the pre-bubble period or post-war period).
In addition, it is also important to consider the ￿softer￿ sides of M&A decisions that
are hard to capture in quantitative data. As already mentioned, there are many
decision variables for a manager to consider before an M&A deal is settled, and apart
from managerial motives, irrational behavior and cultural values, events such as19
unexpected disclosure or access to hidden information (about persons or the firms
involved) on either side can be decisive factors for the outcome of a deal.
Connecting to Nelson￿s (1959) arguments vs. those of Town (1992), the results of the
regressions in this paper are not transparent and it is hard to evaluate from this limited
sample whose arguments are most consistent with the situation in Japan. The record-
long recession in Japan during the 1990￿s with falling stock indices has coincided
with increased number of M&As. However, the M&A pattern has also varied
positively with the GDP growth. Therefore, further research is needed to establish the
relation between macro variables and the M&A pattern for the Japanese case.
Additional suggestions for future research are the collection of longer time series and
between-group analyses. Long-term time series would undoubtedly be of great value
for a profound analysis of the Japanese M&A pattern and in constructing robust
models. In such an analysis, not only the significance of the regression results would
increase, but it would also allow for extensive testing of the effects of important
￿shocks￿, such as the ones discussed above. Another analysis improvement would
also be to divide the data into subcategories based on the size of firms (in terms of
capital, turnover, number of personnel, etc.) and size or payment type (cash or share
swapping) of M&A deals. In any case, there is much more to do in this specific study
area, and the main future challenge for researchers is probably to formulate a robust
theory of M&A. In addition, as far as Japanese M&As are concerned, yet another
challenge is to find high quality data, or to have access to data that is strictly kept by
firms and organizations.20
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Appendix
Table 3. Bivariate correlations of the variables included in the model.
Controlling for..    LNTOPIX
                LNMA      LNGDP
LNMA          1,0000      ,8362
             (    0)    (   30)
             P= ,       P= ,000
LNGDP          ,8362     1,0000
             (   30)    (    0)
             P= ,000    P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Table 4. Partial correlation between the dependent variable and lnGDP, controlling for lnTopix.
Controlling for..    LNGDP
                LNMA    LNTOPIX
LNMA          1,0000     -,3382
             (    0)    (   30)
             P= ,       P= ,058
LNTOPIX       -,3382     1,0000
             (   30)    (    0)
             P= ,058    P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
























Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *. 23
Controlling for..    LNMA
               LNGDP    LNTOPIX
LNGDP         1,0000      ,1279
             (    0)    (   30)
             P= ,       P= ,486
LNTOPIX        ,1279     1,0000
             (   30)    (    0)
             P= ,486    P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Table 6. Partial correlation between the independent variables, controlling for the dependent variable.